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This paper aims to study a single species fishery model with Von Berta-
lanffy law of growth. The dynamical and the bionomic steady states are
determined and their natures are examined from the biological and the eco-
nomical points of view. The optimal harvest policy is studied by taking the
fishing effort as a dynamic control variable.
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1 Introduction
One of the major renewable resources for the human community is fish and hence there
is a real necessity to mathematically analyse the different aspects of the functioning of
a fishery. Various form of equation have been proposed and used in fishery biology;
for example Logistic model, Von Bertalanffy model and Gompertz model (Iwasa, 1978).
Biologist M.B.Schaefer developed a fishery model, known as Schaefer model, obeying
the Logistic law of growth and adopted the CPUE (catch-per-unit-effort) hypothesis
to represent the catch-rate function (Schaefer, 1957; Clark, 1990). In spite of various
limitations of the Logistic growth function, the Schaefer model is still being used for its
simplicity in commercial marine fisheries. The model was also extended to non-selective
harvesting of two ecologically independed species (Clark, 1990) and also to the case
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of combined harvesting of two competing species (Chaudhuri, 1986, 1988). Schaefer
(1954) also discussed various aspects of the dynamics of populations important to the
management of the commercial marine fisheries: this article was reprinted (Schaefer,
1991) a few years ago.
Here we develop a single species fishery model on the basis of the Von Bertaranphy
model (Bertalanffy, 1957; Iwasa, 1978; Thompson and Cauley, 1979). The growth rate
function of this model follows Medawar’s ‘law of growth’ (Thompson and Cauley, 1979).
The silent features of Medawar’s laws are:
(i)size is a monotonically increasing function, that is, a fish always grows larger when
the population size is small,
(ii) the process of growth is multiplicative and in general, will be described by equa-
tions of logarithmic form,
(iii) the specific acceleration of growth is always negative under conditions of growth.
The problem is first formulated on the basis of the CPUE hypothesis and then we
discuss the dynamical behaviour, bionomic equilibrium and optimal harvest policy. We
carry out dynamical optimization, in the sense that the harvesting effort E(t) is taken
as a dynamic variable, using Pontryagin’s maximum principle (Pontryagin, Boltyanskii
and Gamkrelidze). Silent features of the results are discussed in the relevant section of
the paper.
Our motivation for introducing the Von Bertalanffy growth law primarily lies in the
superiority of the Von Bertalanffy law over the Logistic law. Since ideal living conditions
prevail in the initial stage, there should be very rapid growth initially. Thereafter, as the
population grows, the limitations of resources forces the growth rate to decline and the
population gradually approaches the saturation level. Compared to the logistic law, Von
Bertalanffy law exhibits faster early growth, but a slower approach to the asymptote,
with a longer period of linear growth about the point of inflexion.
When the fish population size becomes considerably large, it tends to maintain a
stronger pressure on the newly produced biomass through cannibalism and also there
is intra specific competition amongst the individuals in the population for the use of
limited resources available in the habitat. These effects, coupled together, should retard
the growth of the population to a large extent and as a result, the population size
should approach its asymptote rapidly as in the case of logistic model. These retarding
effects are, however, counterbalanced to some extend by group movement (Mostofsky,
1978) which is a special behavioural characteristic of a fish population. As a result, the
approach of the population size to the asymptote is slowed down. This feature of faster
early growth and slower approach to the asymptote is reflected in the Von Bertalanffy
law of growth.
Moreover, implication of exploiting a biological population obeying the Von Berta-
lanffy law of growth have not so far been studied. This fact has motivated us to develop
the present model.
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2 Statement of the problem
Tsoularis (2001) proposed a modified Verhulst logistic equation which they termed the
generalized logistic equation. This has the form
dx
dt
= rxα
[
1−
(
x
k
)β]γ
where x(t) denote the population density at time t and α, β, γ are positive real numbers.
Here we consider a single species fishery. It is assumed that the density of fish population
follows Von Bertalanffy growth function (VBGF) at a rate qEx2/3 where E denote the
harvesting effort and q is a constant, called catchability coefficient. In VBGF, growth
is defined as the net result of the process of anabolism and catabolism which is the
particular case of generalized logistic growth model when α = 2/3, β = 1/3, γ = 1. Then
growth equation becomes
dx
dt
= rx2/3 − r
k1/3
x− qEx2/3 = F (x)− qEx2/3 (1)
where r is the intrinsic growth rate and k is a constant, called the carrying capacity,
such that k = limt→∞ x(t) when E = 0.
Here we have taken the production function of the form
h = qEφ(x), φ(x) = x2/3 (1a)
where
φ′(x) =
2
3
x−1/3 > 0 and φ′′(x) = −2
9
x−4/3 < 0.
Therefore, the production function h(x,E) exhibits decreasing marginal returns to the
input factor x as a consequence of ultimate gear saturation (Clark, 1990).
2.1 Equilibrium Solution
In order to find out the equilibrium solution of (1),we set dx/dt = 0. Now,
dx
dt
= 0 gives x =
{
0 = x¯1 (say)
k
r3
(r − qE)3 = x¯2(say)
(2)
We observe that the existence of the nontrivial steady state (x¯2) depends on the biotech-
nical productivity ( BTP) rq (Clark, 1990). When the effort level (E) lies below the BTP
of this fish species, there exists a non-trivial steady state (x2) with non-extinction of fish
species. Here we assume that
E <
(
r
q
)
(3)
We now prove the following theorems:
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Theorem 1. The trivial steady state x¯1 is unstable and the non-trivial steady state x¯2
is stable.
Proof. We have
d
dx
(
dx
dt
)∣∣∣∣
x=
→∞ as  → 0+
and
d
dx
(
dx
dt
)∣∣∣∣
x=x2
= − r
3k1/3
< 0.
Hence x¯1 is an unstable equilibrium and x¯2 = (k/r
3)(r − qE)3 is a stable equilibrium.
Theorem 2. The non-trivial steady state x¯2 is globally asymptotically stable for x(t) >
0.
Proof. Now x(t) > x¯2
⇒ (r − qE) x−1/3 − r
k1/3
< 0
(
since E < rq
)
⇒ dx
dt
= x
[
(r − qE) x−1/3 − r
k1/3
]
> 0, provided x(t) > 0.
Similarly x(t) < x¯2 ⇒ dx/dt > 0, provided x(t) > 0. Thus x(t) increases for
0 < x < x¯2 and decreases for x(t) > x¯2. Hence x(t) = x¯2 is a globally asymptotically
stable equilibrium point for positive x(t) in the sense that limt→∞ x(t) = x¯2 provided
x(0) > 0.
Theorem 3. The non-trivial steady state x¯2 > or < (8k/27) according to whether
E < r/3q or> r/3q where r/q =(biotic-potential)/(catchability coefficient) is called
the Biotechnical Productivity (Clark, 1990) of the fish species being harvested.
Proof. F (x) = rx2/3 − r
k1/3
x
F ′(x) = r
[
2
3
x−1/3 − 1
k1/3
]
and F ′′(x) = −2r
9
x−4/3 < 0.
F ′(x) = 0 gives x = 827k.
So at x = 8k/27, F (x) has a maximum value.
Thus the biological productivity of the population is maximized at x = 8k/27. Now,
x¯2 = k
[
1− qE
r
]3
>
8
27
k
⇒
(
1
3
− qE
r
) [(
1− qE
r
)2
+
2
3
(
1− qE
r
)
+
4
9
]
> 0
⇒ E < r
3q
since E <
r
q
Similarly, x¯2 <
8
27
k ⇒ E > r
3q
.
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2.2 General Solution
The Von Bertalanffy model with a given value of the effort E is shown in Figures 1 and
2.
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Figure 1: von Bertalanffy growth model with constant rate of effort E (r = 30, k =
5, E = 60, q = .1)
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Figure 2: von Bertalanffy growth model with constant rate of effort E (r = 30, k =
5, E = 120, q = .1)
We now solve Equation (1). We have
dx
dt
= x(r1x
−1/3 − rk−1/3), where r1 = r − qE > 0
or
(kx)1/3dx
x(r1k1/3 − rx1/3)
= dt
integrating this relation, we have
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∣∣∣r1k1/3 − rx1/3∣∣∣ = C1 e− r3k1/3 t
as t → ∞, x(t) → x¯2. It is thus once more confirmed that the population level x = x¯2
is globally asymptotically stable.
Theorem 4. For the Von Bertalanffy law of population growth, the exploited population
undergoes accelerated growth when x(t) ∈ (0, 8x¯2/27) and retarded growth when x(t) ∈
(8x¯2/27, x¯2). Also population decreases with positive acceleration when x(t) > x¯2.
Proof. From (1), we have
d2x
dt2
= r2x1/3
{(
x
k
)1/3
−
(
1− qE
r
)}{(
x
k
)1/3
− 2
3
(
1− qE
r
)}
Therefore, dxdt > 0 and
d2x
dt2
> 0 when x(t) ∈
(
0, 8x¯227
)
.
Also dxdt > 0 and
d2x
dt2
< 0 when x(t) ∈
(
8
27 x¯2, x¯2
)
, since x¯2 = k
(
1− qEr
)3
> 0 as E < rq .
Similarly dxdt < 0 and
d2x
dt2
> 0 when x(t) > x¯2.
The solution curves are shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Solution curves (r = 25, k = 5, E = 60, q = .1)
2.3 Maximum Sustainable Yield
The Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) of a biological resource population is the max-
imum rate at which it can be harvested even after maintaining the population at a
constant level.
The harvesting effort and the population level corresponding to MSY are denoted by
EMSY and xMSY respectively.
Theorem 5. The maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY)= 4rk2/3/27 occurs at the effort
level EMSY = r/3q and the population level xMSY = 8k/27.
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Proof. For a given effort E, the sustainable yield Y (E) is given by
Y (E) = qE(x¯2)
2/3 = qEk2/3
(
r − qE
r
)2
by (2)
so
dY
dE
= qk2/3
(
1− qE
r
)(
1− 3qE
r
)
and
dY
dE
= 0⇒ E = r
3q
since E < rq .
Again
d2Y
dE2
= −q
2k2/3
r2
{(r − 3qE) + 3(r − qE)}
so
d2Y
dE2
∣∣∣∣
E= r
3q
= −2q
2k2/3
r
< 0.
Therefore, Y (E) is maximum when E =
r
3q
(= EMSY ).
Hence, MSY = Y (E)|E= r
3q
=
4
27
rk2/3
and xMSY = k
(
r − qE
r
)3∣∣∣∣
E= r
3q
=
8k
27
.
Thus the MSY = 4rk2/3/27 occurs at the effort level EMSY = r/3q = (BTP )/3 and
the corresponding population level is xMSY = 8k/27. Any value of E > EMSY , r/3q <
E < r/q. Then the sustainable yield Y (E) monotonically decreases with E towards
zero. Biologists call it a case of biological overexploitation (Clark, 1990; Pradhan and
Chaudhuri, 1998) whenever the effort level exceeds its MSY level.
Observe that the population level x = xMSY at which productivity of the biological
resource (fish) is maximized, is not the natural equilibrium level k, it is only 8/27 times
that level. It is also noted that, in the case of the Schaefer model (Schaefer, 1957) the
MSY population level is xMSY = k/2 > 8k/27. Thus the Schaefer model prescribes a
MSY population level higher that in the present model.
2.4 Yield-Effort Curve
The yield obtainable from exploitation of a biological resource depends on the effort rate
at which it is harvested. Mathematically it is expressed as Y = Y (E) where ‘Y’ stands
for yield. A pictorial representation of this relation in the Y − E plane is known as the
yield-effort curve.
The yield-effort curve is shown in Figure 4.
3 Bionomic Equilibrium
The term bionomic equilibrium is an amalgamation of the concept of biological equi-
librium and economic equilibrium. Biological equilibrium is given by dx/dt = 0 and
economic equilibrium is said to be achieved when TR (total revenue obtained by selling
the harvested biomass) equals TC (total cost for the effort devoted to harvesting).
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Figure 4: Yield-effort curve (r = 25, k = 5, q = .1)
The bionomic equilibrium (x∞, E∞) is given as a solution of the system of equations
dx
dt
= (r − qE)x2/3 − r
k1/3
x = 0 (4)
and
Π = TR− TC = pqEx2/3 − cE = 0 (5)
where c= constant fishing cost per unit effort and p= constant price per unit biomass.
From (5),
x∞ =
(
c
pq
)3/2
or E∞ = 0. (6)
Substituting E∞ = 0 in (4) we get x∞ = 0 or k and
E∞ =
r
q
[
1− 1
k1/3
(
c
pq
)1/2]
when x∞ =
(
c
pq
) 3
2
. (7)
To examine the nature of the bionomic equilibrium level of effort E∞, we analyse the
following cases :
(i) If c > k2/3pq then no positive bionomic equilibrium exists. So E∞ = 0 and fishery
remains unexploited. Hence we conclude that if the fishing cost is sufficiently high
relative to the price of fish as in curve TC1 in Figure 5 ,then the fisherman’s choice
should be to stop fishing. Because the market value of fish, even though it may be
positive, does not offset the expense of catching the fish.
Electronic Journal of Applied Statistical Analysis 125
(ii) If c < k2/3pq then unique positive bionomic equilibrium point exist.
Two cases arise here.
(a) 4k2/3/9 < c/pq < k2/3. This implies xMSY = 8k/27 < x∞ < k and EMSY =
r/3q > E∞, the bionomic equilibrium is established at a level such as E2∞ in Figure
5. At this stage the effort is still below the level of maximum sustainable biological
yield EMSY and the fishery becomes profitable. The bionomic equilibrium ensures that
there is no biological overfishing and fisherman should, therefore, operate at the bionomic
equilibrium (x∞, E∞). The MSY level (xMSY , EMSY ) can be the fisherman’s choice only
if there is no consideration of economic factors. If effort can somehow reduced then TR
and TC both are decrease, but positive economic rent achieved. Due to this, fisherman
applies excessive effort and ultimately producing zero rent i.e. economic overfishing
occures.
(b) If 0 < c/pq < 4k2/3/9, i.e., x∞ < xMSY = 8k/27, then E∞ > EMSY . Therefore,
the bionomic equilibrium population level is lower than its MSY level and the bionomic
equilibrium level of effort exceeds its MSY level. This situation also indicates that if the
cost-price ratio becomes sufficient low, equilibrium is established at a level E∞ > EMSY
and biological over-fishing occurs as in curve TC3 in Figure 5. In this case the fisherman
should not operate at the bionomic equilibrium. Here also economic overfishing occures.
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Figure 5: Bionomic equilibrium levels (r = 2.5, k = 15, q = .1, p = 40, c1 = 28, c2 =
14, c3 = 3)
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4 Optimal Harvest Policy
The net economic revenue at any time is given by
Π = {pqx2/3(t)− c}E(t) (8)
Our purpose is to maximize the present value J of a continuous time-stream of revenues
given by (Clark, 1990)
J =
∫ ∞
0
e−δt{pqx2/3(t)− c}E(t)dt (9)
where δ(> 0) is the instantaneous annual rate of discount. If one unit of money be
invested at an annual interest rate δ(per unit of money), continuously compounded,
then the amount in the account at some time t will be eδt. Hence one has to multiply
any future revenue by the discounting factor e−δt in order to convert it to the present
value.
We intend to maximize (9) subject to the state equation (1) by invoking Pontryagin’s
Maximum Principle (Pontryagin, Boltyanskii and Gamkrelidze). The control variable
E(t) is subject to restriction 0 ≤ E(t) ≤ Emax ,Emax stands for a feasible upper limit of
the harvesting effort and it may be a constant or a function of x and t. Here V = [0, Emax]
is the control set.
Our purpose is to determine E(t) and the corresponding response x(t) which maximize
(9) subject to the conditions stated above. We now solve this optimal control problem
by taking the control variable E(t) as a dynamic (i.e. time dependent) variable.
In all the following conditions, the variables x and E are to be taken as functions of t ir-
respective of whether it is mentioned explicitly or not. Let us construct the Hamiltonian :
H = e−δt(pqx2/3 − c)E(t) + λ(t)
[
{r − qE(t)}x2/3 − r
k1/3
x
]
= {e−δt(pqx2/3 − c)− λqx2/3}E(t) + λ(t)r
{
x2/3 − x
k1/3
}
= σ(t)E(t) + λ(t)r
{
x2/3 − x
k1/3
}
(10)
where
σ(t) = e−δt(pqx2/3 − c)− λqx2/3 (11)
Considering that E(t) is an optimal control and x is the corresponding response, the
maximal principle ensures the existence of adjoint variable λ(t) for all t ≥ 0 such that
dλ
dt
= −∂H
∂x
= −(e−δtpq − λq)2
3
x−1/3E(t)− rλ(t)
{
2
3
x−1/3 − 1
k1/3
}
. (12)
From (10), we have
HE =
∂H
∂E
= σ(t) (13)
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According to the maximum principle, the optimal control E(t) must maximize the Hamil-
tonian H. Clearly the optimal control E(t) must satisfy the conditions :
E(t) =
{
Emax when σ(t) > 0
0 when σ(t) < 0
Since σ(t) causes E(t) to switch between 0 and Emax , σ(t) is called the switching
function. Hence E(t) is a bang-bang control switching from one extreme level (zero) to
the other one (Emax) or vice-versa.
Now, HE > or < 0 according as p−cx−2/3/q > or < λeδt. Since a unit harvest (h∆t =
1, h = qEx2/3) incurs a cost equal to cE∆t = cx−2/3h∆t/q = cx−2/3/q (whereh =
qEx2/3is the catch rate), we see that cx−2/3/q is equal to the unit harvesting cost when
the population level is x. Therefore, p − (cx−2/3/q) equals to the net economic revenue
on the unit harvest. Hence we conclude that E = Emax or 0 according to whether the
net economic revenue on a unit harvest is greater or less than the shadow price (λeδt)
(Clark, 1990) of the population respectively (since HE = σ(t)) by (13). When the net
economic revenue on a unit harvest equals this shadow price, we have HE = σ(t) = 0.
Once σ(t) vanishes, the Hamiltonian function H becomes independent of the control
variable E(t) and its optimal value cannot be determined by the above procedure. It is
then called a singular control E∗(t), 0 < E∗(t) < Emax.
Therefore , the optimal harvest policy is E =

Emax if HE > 0
0 if HE < 0
E∗(t) if HE = 0
Using (13), the necessary condition for a singular extremal HE = 0 yields
λ(t) =
e−δt(pqx2/3 − c)
qx2/3
(14)
The other condition to be satisfied along a singular extremal are (Goh, 1980):
DHE = 0, D
2HE = 0, (D
2HE)E > 0,
where D ≡ ddt and the subscripts denote partial differentiation. Using (13) and (1), we
get
DHE = e
−δtpq
[
2
3
rx1/3 −
(
2r
3k1/3
+ δ
)
x2/3
]
− λqr
3k1/3
x2/3 + cδe−δt (15)
Thus DHE = 0 gives
λ = pe−δt
[
2
(
k
x
)1/3
−
(
2 +
3δk1/3
r
)
+
3cδk1/3
pqrx2/3
]
(16)
Again differentiating (15) with respect to t and after some simplifications, we have
D2HE =
e−δtpq
[
2
3
δx1/3
{
qE + 2r
((
x
k
)1/3
− 1
)}
+ δ2x2/3 +
2r2
9
{
1− 2
(
x
k
)1/3}
{
1−
(
x
k
)1/3}
+
2
9
rqE
{
3
(
x
k
)1/3
− 1
}]
− qr
2λ
9
(
x
k
)2/3
− cδ2e−δt (17)
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Therefore,
(D2HE)E = e
−δtpq2
2x1/3
3
{
δ + r
(
1
k1/3
− 1
3x1/3
)}
(18)
For the existence of an optimal singular control, it is required to satisfy the generalized
Legendre condition (Goh, 1980):
(D2HE)E > 0⇒ x1/3 > rk
1/3
3(r + δK1/3)
(19)
Now D2HE = 0 gives (by using (14)):
E =
(
9δ2 − r2
k2/3
)
(pqx2/3 − c)− 12pqδrx1/3
{
1−
(
x
k
)1/3}
2pq2
{
r − 3δx1/3 − 3r
(
x
k
)1/3} +
2r2pq
{
1− 3
(
x
k
)1/3
+ 2
(
x
k
)2/3}
2pq2
{
r − 3δx1/3 − 3r
(
x
k
)1/3} (20)
Equation (20) yields the optimal singular control E∗(t) in terms of the optimal popula-
tion levels x∗(t) where x∗(t) is determined as follows:
From (14) and (16), we have
e−δt(pqx2/3 − c)
qx2/3
= pe−δt
[
2
(
k
x
)1/3
−
(
2 +
3δk1/3
r
)
+
3cδk1/3
pqrx2/3
]
⇒ {x∗(t)}1/3 =
rk1/3 +
√
r2k2/3 + 3cpq (r + δk
1/3)(r + 3δk1/3)
3(r + δk1/3)
(21)
since x∗(t) > 0. Which satisfies the Legendre condition (19). The necessary condition
HE = 0 for a singular extremal control E
∗(t), where 0 < E∗(t) < Emax, implies
e−δt(pqx2/3 − c) = λqx2/3
⇒ e−δt ∂Π
∂E
=
∂
∂E
(λh) (by(8)) (22)
where h = qEx2/3 is the catch rate. In economics, the rate of change of the revenue Π
with respect to the effort E(= ∂Π/∂E), is called the marginal revenue of effort. When
this is multiplied by the discounting factor e−δt,i.e. e−δt(∂Π/∂E), we get the present
value of the marginal revenue of effort. The adjoint variable λ is interpreted as the
marginal user cost along the optimal trajectory x∗(t). To understand this interpretation
of λ, one has to study the economic interpretation of the Maximum Principle (Clark,
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1990). With this interpretation of λ, λh is the total user cost or simply user cost. The
right hand side of (22) may be interpreted as the marginal user cost of effort. Therefore
the optimal equilibrium solution is obtained when the present value of the marginal
revenue of effort equals the marginal user cost of effort.
We now discuss the following cases :
(i) If δ = 0, we have from (6) and (21)
x∗1/3
x
1/3
MSY
=
1
2
{
1 +
√
1 +
(
x∞
k
)2/3}
> 1 ⇒ x∗ > xMSY since xMSY = 8k/27.
Therefore, for zero interest rate,the optimal population level (x∗) is always greater than
the MSY population level (xMSY ). This result is valid only if there is no discounting of
money, i.e. if the money-value does not change with time.
(ii) x∗ → x∞ as δ → ∞ by (6) and (21). Thus positive discount rate leads to
progressively decreasing optimal population level x∗ that tends to x∞ as δ →∞. In this
case Π→ 0 from (5).
This implies that infinite interest rate leads to complete dissipation of the economic
revenue(i.e. the total revenue equals to the total cost). This type of situation arises
in an open-access fishery (Clark, 1990) where the fishermen are forced to set a zero
value on future revenues because access to the fishery is open to anybody at all times.
Mathematically, the discounting factor e−δt → 0 as the interest rate δ → ∞ and hence
the present value of a future revenue is reduced to zero. Economically, a high interest
rate implies a high inflation rate. Since the real value of the resource declines rapidly
under a high rate of inflation, the management (or the owner) of the resource stock
prefer to exploit it at a no-profit no-loss basis.
(iii) If c (fishing cost per unit effort)=0, we have x∞ =
(
c
pq
)3/2
= 0 and then
x∗ =
8k
27
(
1 + δrk
1/3
)3 < 8k27 = xMSY .
Therefore in this case x∞ = 0 and x∗ 6= 0.
Thus, when cost of fishing is zero (or negligible), the optimal population level (x∗) is
always less than its MSY level (xMSY ).
Now, δr →∞⇒ x∗ → 0. The optimal harvest policy in this situation implies the most
rapid possible extinction of the resource population. Therefore, if the growth rate (δ) of
the economy being much higher than the growth rate (r) of the resource, the owner of
the fishery makes no delay in cashing out the fishery and in investing the earning in the
economy.
5 Conclusions
Present paper deals with a problem of single species fishery model in which growth of the
fish population follows Von Bertalanffy growth function. It is seen that for this model
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xMSY = 8k/27 which is lower than that of Schaefer model (xMSY = k/2) . This implies
that the resource population can be safely exploited without causing over exploitation,
up to a level much lower than the MSY population level in the Schaefer model. From
the view point of conservation of resources, we conclude that there is no need of taking
a conservative view to maintain the population level at an unnecessarily higher level in
order to avoid over exploitation. When cost-price ratio becomes sufficiently low, then
both biological and economic overfishing occures. If non negative bionomic equilibrium
is less than EMSY then economic overfishing occures but biological overfishing does not
occure. So it is necessary to control the fishery by stopping fishing effort or forced to
impose ever shorter fishing seasons by fishery management for long run. Using Pontrya-
gin,s Maximum Principle, optimal harvest policy has been discussed using effort as a
control variable. It has been found that the present value of the marginal revenue of
effort equals the marginal user cost of effort. It has also been noted that infinite discount
rate yields zero economic rent i.e. the fishery should remain unexploited and when cost
of fishing is negligble, instantaneous annual rate of discount is verry high then resource
population is extinct.
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